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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents, Albert Noorda and Sam L. Guss, cannot 
agree entire! y with the statement of facts contained in the 
brief of appellants and consequently feel compelled to bring 
certain matters to the attention of this Honorable Court in the 
following statement. 
The Valley Sausage Company is a Utah corporation, 
manufacturing pork products into various types of sausage 
(Tr. 234, 235, 251 & 252). This corporation was not a party 
to the instant suits (Tr. 34 & 35). The defendants and re-
spondents, Albert Noorda and Sam L. Guss, along with a son 
of Mr. Guss, do business as a partnership under the firm name 
of Jordan Meat & Livestock Company (Tr. 34). This partner-
ship, hereinafter referred to as Jordan Meat, is a wholesale 
distributor for the meat products manufactured by Valley 
Sausage Company (Tr. 23, 24 & 242). The partnership does 
no manufacturing (Tr. 243). 
Prior to May, 195 5, Jordan Meat was selling processed 
pork products to defendant Suhrmann, a retail meat dealer 
doing business as South Temple Meat Company (Tr. 87). The 
usual practice was for Suhrmann to place his order through a 
Mr. Block, one of the salesmen for Jordan Meat but if Block 
could not understand Suhrmann because of the German lan-
guage barrier, then in such instances, Alfred Hoffman was 
called to the telephone to act as an interpreter (Tr. 34, 264 
& 265). Hoffman was a sausage maker employed by Valley 
Sausage Company; there \vas no telephone in the sausage 
kitchen where Hoffn1an worked and it was therefore necessary 
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for those at the sales office of Jordan Meat to summon him 
when needed as an interpreter (Tr. 29, 32, 34, 304 & 305). 
In May, 1955, defendant Suhrmann was informed by 
Jordan Meat that Valley Sausage Company could not furnish 
any more of the product known as mettwurst and a conversa-
tion took place at the Valley Sausage plant between defendant 
Noorda and Suhrmann wherein Noorda told Suhrmann, 
through Albert Hoffman acting as an interpreter, that they 
could no longer sell the finished product of mettwurst to 
Suhrmann because their ovens could not be cooled down during 
the week for the processing of it. Prior to this time, all of the 
mettwurst sold to Suhrmann had been fully processed in the 
large smoke ovens of Valley Sausage Company and heated 
to 13 7 or 140 degrees Fahrenheit to insure the elimination 
of any trichina in the pork used in making the product (Tr. 
243, 244, 245, 256, 257, 287 & 288). Defendant Suhrmann 
also told N oorda that they were smoking the mettwurst too 
much and that his customers didn't like it that way (Tr. 245); 
also that he had a smoke oven at his place of business and 
proposed that he buy the mettwurst in a raw and unprocessed 
state and represented that he knew how to process the product 
to completion for retail sale to his customers (Tr. 246, 247 
& 248). From that time, all mettwurst sold to defendant 
Suhrmann by Jordan Meat was in a raw and unprocessed 
condition and was further processed by Suhrmann at his own 
place of business (Tr. 64, 210, 211, 248, 249, 252, 25 3, 294 
& 295). Noorda had no knowledge of what equipment 
Suhrmann had at his place of business nor had he or defendant 
Guss told Suhrmann about the further processing of the raw 
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mettwurst which had been sold to Suhrmann after May, 1955 
(Tr. 33, 255 & 256). 
Defendant Suhrmann testified that Alfred Hoffman had 
instructed him in the method of curing raw mettwurst or had 
assisted him in so doing. This was emphatically denied by 
Hoffman (Tr. 282, 283 & 297). 
Noorda contradicted the testimony of defendant Suhr-
mann and his wife that any mettwurst smoked and processed 
by Suhrmann was returned to Jordan Meat for re-sale (Tr. 
249 & 250). The same price was charged Suhrmann for the 
raw mettwurst as had been charged for the processed product 
except that Suhrmann received a credit in poundage amounting 
roughly to 5% on account of the shrinkage resulting from 
the heat created in processing the raw mettwurst (Tr. 248, 
249, 250, 254 & 255). 
Inspectors from the Salt Lake City Board of Health were 
present at the plant of Valley Sausage Company during all 
business hours (Tr. 29, 30, 212, 213). The pork trimmings 
which were used by Valley Sausage Company in the manu-
facturing of its products were purchased from a Federal 
inspected plant in the midwest and appeared wholesome and 
fresh (Tr. 201, 202 & 203). 
There is no practical method of inspecting hogs for the 
presence of the trichina organism (Tr. 12, 13, 214, 215) and 
no law or regulation requires that unfinished pork products 
be inspected for the presence of the organism in any slaughter 
house or n1eat processing plant (Tr. 12. 13 & 14); nor is there 
any law or regulation requiring that pork products sold by the 
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manufacturer or wholesaler in a raw condition, not ready for 
human consumption without further processing, smoking or 
cooking, be subjected to freezing or heating (Tr. 13, 14 & 21). 
The samples of mettwurst taken by the inspectors from 
the Jordan Meat were negative insofar as the trichina or-
ganism was concerned (Tr. 220). All mettwurst which was 
sold as a finished product by Jordan Meat had been heated 
to at least the required temperature of 13 7° Fahrenheit in 
the Valley Sausage Company plant for the purpose of eliminat-
ing trichina (Tr. 37 & 38). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court sub-
mitted the case to the jury by way of a special verdict (R. 46, 
47 & 48), and thereafter a judgment was entered in favor 
of both plaintiffs and against defendant Suhrmann, and in 
favor of the defendants Noorda and Guss d/b/a Jordan 
Meat, and against the two plaintiffs, no cause of action ( R. 
107, 108 & 109). The trial court also granted the Motion of 
defendants Noorda and Guss to dismiss the Cross-Complaint 
of defendant Suhrmann (R. 116 and 117). Motions for a new 
trial filed by plaintiffs and defendant Suhrmann were denied 
by the trial court and these appeals were taken (R. 119 in 
Schneider case and R. 22 in Bodon case) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS NOORDA 
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AND GUSS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 
REASON THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND DEFEND-
ANTS NOORDA AND GUSS GUlL TY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS 
TO CONTRACT TRICHINOSIS. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS NOORDA 
AND GUSS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 
REASON THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND DEFEND-
ANTS NOORDA AND GUSS GUlL TY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS 
TO CONTRACT TRICHINOSIS. 
In the brief filed by the plaintiffs, they persist in making 
the statement that the processing of the raw mettwurst was to 
be done by defendant Suhrmann under the supervision of 
Jordan Meat. We readily admit that Suhrmann so testified 
but it must be remembered that he has no defense to these 
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actions and consequently has used every means at his disposal 
to try and shift the burden of liability to defendants N oorda 
and Guss. Suhrmann' s contentions in this respect were per-
sistently denied by Noorda (Tr. 33, 254, 255, 256), and the 
employee of Valley Sausage Company, Alfred Hoffman (Tr. 
282, 283). In addition to this, the jury by their findings in 
questions No. 3 and No. 4 of the Special Verdict answered 
to the effect that if Hoffman did assist defendant Suhrmann 
1n the processing of the mettwurst sausage that he was not 
then an agent of Noorda or Guss (R. 47). We respectfully 
submit that such a finding by the jury is conclusive and binding 
on the parties, and thus must be taken as a fact that neither 
Noorda, Guss nor the Jordan Meat had anything to do with 
the further processing of the mettwurst. 
Plaintiffs also contend that because the jury found in 
answer to question No. 5 (b) that a reasonably prudent person 
in the position of Noorda and Guss would have known that 
Suhrmann intended to sell the mettwurst without processing 
it to kill trichina, the trial court erred in entering a judgment 
in favor of the said defendants, Noorda and Guss, and against 
the plaintiffs. We respectfully submit that a close scrutiny 
of the evidence fails to disclose any fact from which the jury 
could reasonably have reached such a conclusion. Suhrmann 
repeatedly testified that he talked only with Hoffman when 
dealing with Jordan Meat (Tr. 62, 87, 96, 113 & 119), and 
in view of the jury's finding in response to question No. 4, 
mentioned above, any knowledge acquired by Hoffman relative 
to the skill, knowledge or intentions of the defendant Suhrmann 
regarding the further processtng of the mettwurst certainly 
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could not be considered as imputed to defendants Noorda and 
Guss. Mrs. Suhrmann testified that she dealt only with Hoffman 
in making purchases of mettwurst from Jordan Meat (Tr. 
143). Her dealings with Noorda were only in connection with 
returns and receiving credits for shrinkage (Tr. 145, 146 & 
147). Noorda testified as to his conversation with Suhrmann 
relative to selling him raw and unprocessed mettwurst but he 
was dealing with a man in the meat business and there is 
nothing in the transcript of this conversation that would give 
N oorda cause to doubt Suhrmann' s ability or intention to 
further process the mettwurst in accordance with the standards 
prescribed for the elimination of trichina ( T r. 244, 245 & 246). 
Suhrmann said he had a smoke oven at his place of business 
(Tr. 248). There was no duty placed upon Noorda to deter-
mine if defendant Suhrmann was competent to conduct his 
own meat business and as the raw mettwurst had no appearance 
of being ready to eat, or in an edible state when sold to 
Suhrmann, there accordingly was no basis for a finding of 
negligence on the part of either of the defendants Noorda or 
Guss. This was the conclusion reached by the trial court and 
one of the reasons for the lower court entering judgment upon 
motion in favor of these defendants and against the plaintiffs. 
This Honorable Court has often considered the question 
of review of a jury's determination on appeal, and in Seybold 
vs. Union Pacific Ry. Conzpany, 121 Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, said: 
nw e have 110 disagreement \Vith the time-honored 
rule that if there is substantial evidence to support the 
conclusion of the trier of the fact it will not be dis-
turbed on review. But that means n1ore than a mere 
10 
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scintilla of evidence. See Wigmore 3rd Ed. Sec. 2494 
... If there is any substantial competent evidence upon 
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
the finding it should stand. But if the finding is so 
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no 
jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the :find-
ing, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial 
evidence. See also 20 Am. Jur. 1033." 
Defendants Noorda and Guss respectfully submit that 
aside from the evidence of such knowledge as Hoffman may 
have had there is no ((substantial competent evidence" to 
support the answer of the jury to question No. 5 (b) of the 
Special Verdict as required by the law and as expressed by 
this Court's decisions. 
We now proceed to a consideration of the rules of law 
applicable to the sale of pork and pork products. Plaintiffs 
and appellants cite a number of cases contending for the propo-
sition that where negligence is established there need be no 
privity of contract as a basis for recovery by injured persons. 
These defendants have no quarrel with this general principle 
of law. However, this legal concept is only applicable to 
finished products which are made or manufactured and sold 
at that time in a condition for use or consumption by the 
ultimate consumer, without further processing. Plaintiffs have 
never contended that the mettwurst delivered to Suhrmann in a 
raw or uncooked state was then ready for consumption. It was 
obvious from the appearance of the unprocessed mettwurst in-
troduced at the trial for illustrative purposes that it resembled 
raw sausage, certainly not ready for eating. Suhrmann under-
took to further process the product to make it :fit and ready for 
11 
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eating by his customers. Had this been done properly and in 
accordance with known practices and acceptable standards of 
the packing industry, the resultant product would have been 
completely safe and edible (Tr. 13, 3 7, 245, 292 & 293). 
Trichina is a minute parasite or round worm, microscopic 
in size and invisible to the naked eye (Tr. 5 & 7). It is im-
possible and accordingly impractical for the packing industry 
throughout the United States to inspect slaughtered hogs for 
the presence of trichina (Tr. 12 & 14). Consequently, the 
meat inspection laws merely require that all pieces of pork 
or pork products which have a cooked or smoked appearance 
when placed on the market, must have been treated by heating 
up to 13 7° Fahrenheit or frozen in accordance with prescribed 
methods in order to eliminate the trichina parasite (Tr. 12 
& 13). It is thus the conclusion of the meat inspection 
authorities in the United States that at the present time there 
is no safe and practical method to insure that raw pork products 
are free from trichina and health authorities have concluded 
it best to carry on a public education program during the past 
thirty years to caution the public to cook all raw pork products 
(Tr. 13 & 14). Hence when Suhrmann purchased the raw 
mettwurst from Jordan Meat the product did not have any 
appearance other than being uncooked and unsmoked and 
there was accordingly no duty upon Jordan Meat to have done 
anything to eliminate trichina. The duty was upon Suhrmann 
and he alone to finish the product by smoking at least to a 
temperature of 13 7 degrees. This prescribed temperature is 
extren1ely moderate and \vould have been easily attainable in 
any stnoke oven which Suhrmann testified he used in further 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
processing the product. Even though Suhrmann failed in his 
duty to the plaintiffs in that respect, his undertaking to finish 
the product was conclusive in breaking the chain of causation 
in any negligence which plaintiffs are attempting to impose 
upon the defendants Noorda and Guss. Based upon the fore-
going analysis, these defendants respectfully submit that the 
cases cited by plaintiffs at page 8 in their brief all deal with 
finished products and are not even remotely in point to our 
instant factual situation. 
We believe that since the mettwurst was admittedly to be 
further processed when it was sold by Jordan Meat, the cases 
involving the sale of uncooked pork products set forth the 
rule of law applicable here. In the case of Cheli vs. Cudahy 
Bros. Company} 267 Mich. 690, 255 N W414, the court held 
that even though the packer makes no inspection for trichina, 
he is not guilty of negligence and is not liable to the ultimate 
consumer. On the matter of the implied warranty under the 
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the court there said that 
the warranty is that the food sold is fit for human consumption 
in the ordinary manner, that is cooked. Also, in the case of 
Dressler vs. MerkelJ Inc.J 284 NY Supp 697, 4 NE 2d 744, 
the plaintiff, who became ill from eating trichinous mettwurst, 
failed to recover for negligence against the packer who sup-
plied the pork to the sausage making retailer, the packer 
being held blameless in not foreseeing that the retailer might 
use the pork improperly in processing the mettwurst to be 
eaten by the plaintiff consumer without further cooking. This 
is a case we believe to be precisely in point with our instant 
set of facts. In other words, the wholesaler is entitled to 
13 
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assume that the product which he sells will be put to a normal 
and reasonable use expected of such a product and he is not 
liable where it would ordinarily be safe but the injury results 
because it is mishandled by someone else. See Prosser on 
Torts, page 499, citing Cheli vs. Cudahy Bros. Company, supra; 
Vaccarino vs. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 Atl. 2d 316; Silverman 
vs. Swift Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 Atl. 2d 277; Eisenbach vs. 
Gimbel Bros., 281 NY 474, 24 NE 2d 131. 
Plaintiffs also cite a number of cases tn their brief in 
support of the contention that the sale of trichina infected 
mettwurst by the defendants Noorda and Guss violated Title 
4-20-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dealing with adulterated 
food, and Title 4-20-8, dealing with food products of a dis-
eased animal. It should be considered that all cases cited by 
plaintiffs with respect to such are from the State of Ohio, 
where the courts have adopted a rule of absolute liability, and 
is the minority view in the United States. Those decisions 
hold the seller liable upon mere proof that the meat was impure 
or infected regardless of whether the seller knew, should have 
known, or had any way of determining that the meat sold was 
impure or infected. See Kurth vs. Kt'umme, 143 Ohio St. 638, 
56 N.E. 2d 127; Troietto vs. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d 
13 5, and other cases cited in plaintiff's brief at pages 11 and 
12. We respectfully submit that this minority rule places an 
undue burden on manufacturers and producers of food and 
food products, is exceedingly harsh and unjust, and if followed 
with respect to pork products, would create an impossible 
situation in the meat packing industry. The attention of this 
Court is respectfully invited to the case of Feinstein t'S. Daniel 
14 
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Reeves et al., (D.C. New York, 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 167, 
wherein the court held that since neither the State or Federal 
Government had prohibited the sale of infected pork and had 
made no provisions for any system of inspection to determine 
whether it contained trichina, there was no basis for con-
cluding that the pure food law intended to include hogs 
infected with trichinae under the classification of tediseased 
animals" or ''unfit for food." Further interpreting the pure 
food law in the case of Dressler vs. Merkel, Inc., supra, the 
court likewise held that trichina infected meat is not within 
the meaning of the term ''diseased" and goes on to say that 
as used in the pure food law the term tediseased" must be 
lin1ited to instances where animals are known to be diseased, 
or v1here the disease could be discovered by inspection, or by 
methods commonly used in manufacture. See also Zorger vs. 
Hillman's, 287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N.E. 2d 900. 
It is thus respectfully submitted that the trial court right-
fully rendered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the 
defendants N oorda and Guss and against the plaintiffs in the 
actions tried in the lower court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES. 
The assertions made by plaintiffs under Point II of their 
brief to the effect that the lower court erred in denying their 
15 
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motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequacy of damages 
are without merit. While this proposition does not directly 
concern defendants Noorda and Guss, since no judgment was 
rendered against them, we feel compelled to answer plaintiffs' 
contention in that respect. 
Plaintiffs have sought to detail considerable evidence 
relative to their pain, suffering and alleged disabilities. 
Schneider claimed he was severely incapacitated but apparently 
not too ill, as he went swimming at Saratoga on Utah Lake 
in September, 1955, a month following his illness (Tr. 185 
& 186). Except for the month of August and part of September, 
1955, Schneider carried on his insurance business and importing 
business (Tr. 180, 181 & 182). In ap. effort to prove loss of 
income, his income tax returns were introduced in evidence 
but showed a higher income for 1956 than the three preceding 
years (Tr. 182 & 183). Treatment for Schneider consisted 
largely of vitamin pills prescribed by a naturopath and masseur 
treatments (Tr. 176, 177, 178 & 179). His claim that he suffered 
loss of income from his importing business due to the illness 
is unsupported by the evidence because he changed his avoca-
tion from that to the insurance business due to a fear of war 
coming to Europe and thereby losing his source of products 
(Tr. 153). 
As to the clain1s of Bodon, the evidence adduced per-
taining to his pain, suffering and disability, \vas even weaker. 
He claimed an inability to 'vork as a book binder for about 
one \veek (Tr. 191 & 192). Although he testified that he still 
had weakness in his arms and legs, Bodon played soccer in 
September, 195), and throughout 1955 and 1956 (Tr. 193, 
16 
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194, 196, 197 & 198), to say the least, indulging in a vigorous 
game. 
After listening to the foregoing evidence and observing 
the apparent well-being of each of the plaintiffs, the jury ap-
parently concluded, as any reasonable person would from a 
reading of such evidence, that the damages suffered by each 
of the plaintiffs were negligible. The verdict rendered obviously 
reflects such a feeling on the part of the jury. 
Plaintiffs fail to point out in their brief specifically in 
what respect the verdict of the jury shows they were acting 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. They apparently 
take the position that because the award given was small, it is 
thereby self evident that such must be the case. However, in 
fact and in truth, the jury no doubt came to the conclusion 
that neither Badon nor Schneider was in ill health at the time 
of trial, and that any damage previous! y suffered was minimal 
and of little or no consequence. As is said by the author in 
15 Am. Jur., par. 231, at page 664, on Damages: 
((Generally, a verdict will not be disturbed merely 
on account of the smallness of the damages a warded 
or because the reviewing court would have awarded 
more." 
We respectfully submit that the conclusion reached by 
the jury in our instant cases is amply supported by the evidence 
and there has been no basis shown by either of the plaintiffs 
as a ground for disturbing the verdict or granting a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, we respectfully submit that the 
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judgment rendered by the trial court is in all respects correct, 
and should be affirmed, and that the plaintiffs are not entitled 
to a new trial on any ground. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
ROBERT GORDON and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents, Albert Noorda and 
Sam L. Guss 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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